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0. IHEUKWUMERE*

INTRODUCTION

The first incidence of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the United States was reported in 1981.' Two
years later researchers isolated and identified the AIDS virus,
and subsequently named it the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV). AIDS is presently incurable, and infection invariably results in death.3 HIV may be transmitted a variety of ways, including but not limited to sexual intercourse with an infected
individual, exposure to infected blood or blood products, and
perinatally from mother to child.4
Since the first reported case of AIDS, many have debated
Law Clerk to the Honorable Ricardo C. Jackson of the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas; B.A., 1990, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, summa cum laude;
J.D., 1995, Temple Law School, Bertram K. Wolfe Award Recipient. I gratefully acknowledge the kind advice of Professor Frank M. McClellan of Temple Law School
regarding the exploration of the ethical obligations of practitioners to disclose.
1 See Diane A. Tomlinson, Physicians with AIDS and Their Duty to Patients,43
U. FLA. L. REV. 561, 561 n.2 (1991).
2 See Jody B. Gabel, Liability for Knowing Transmission of H1V: The Evolution
of a Duty to Disclose, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 981, 984 (1994).
3 See Karen C. Lieberman & Arthur R. Derse, HIV-Positive Health Care Workers and the Obligationto Disclose: Do Patientshave a Right to Know?, 13 J. LEGAL
MED. 333 (1992); see also Jay A. Levy, Human Immunodeficiency Viruses and the

Pathogenesisof AIDS, 261 JAMA 2997 (1989) (discussing characteristics of HIV and
possible use of vaccines).
4 See Gabel, supra note 2, at 986.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:715

whether infected medical practitioners are obligated to disclose
their status to patients prior to performing invasive procedures.
Some argue that the risk of transmission is so remote that an infected practitioner has no obligation to disclose.5 Others argue
that an obligation to disclose exists notwithstanding the alleged
remote possibility of transmission.6
This article argues that infected practitioners have both a
legal and ethical obligation to disclose their status to patients
prior to engaging in invasive procedures. 7 This contention emanates from requirements of the informed consent doctrine;
guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the
American Medical Association (AMA), and the American Dental
Association (ADA); the Hippocratic Oath; decisions from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland; and research indicating
uncertainty of the risks of transmission from practitioner to patient.
EMERGENCE OF AIDS

In 1981, five homosexual men became ill with an unusual infection called Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia (PCP). Their infection represented the first incidence of AIDS in the United
States.' Since this first reported case, public reaction to AIDS
has been swift and brutal9 while the rate of infection has esca" See, e.g., Darrell Fun, HIV-Infected Healers: Do Patients Have a Right to
Know, 21 THE BRIEF 6, 8-9 (1992) (arguing that requiring physician to take precautions to prevent spread of disease does not encompass disclosure of his or her HIV
status).
6 See Larry Gostin, Hospitals,Health Care Professionals,
and AIDS: The "Right
to Know" the Health Status of Professionalsand Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 51
(1989) (stating that if patients are required to be tested for HIV same reasoning
should be applied to require testing of practitioners).
7 See Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care
Settings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. 2S, 6S (Supp. 1987) (defining
serious invasive procedure as "surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs, or repair of major traumatic injuries").
See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 30
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 248, 250 (1981) (providing case history of first
five men infected with HIV); see also 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 19,
1995) (reporting that first case of AIDS in world was treated in England in 1959).
9 See Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 n.8 (D.N.J. 1990) (listing various
public reactions to those infected with HIV). Among examples cited in Barrington
were refusals to rent apartments to homosexuals, fire bombing the home of HIV infected hemophiliac children, doctors' refusals to treat infected patients, and requiring an infected defendant to wear a mask in court. Id. at 384-85.
AIDS is a very well-known disease originally associated with traditionally dis-
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lated. By January 1992, the CDC documented 202,730 cases in
the United States.'0 In 1993, AIDS became the leading cause of
death among men and women between the ages of 25 through
44, as the incidence of infection climbed to 441,528." It is estimated that more than one million people are infected with HIV. 2
TRANSMISSION OF THE AIDS VIRUS

Contrary to rumor, there is no evidence that one can contract HIV from insect bites, or from donating blood. 3 Rather, in-

fection with HIV generally results from sexual intercourse with
infected individuals, contact with blood or blood products, or
from mothers to infants either perinatally or through breast
milk. 4 Periods between infection with the virus and full-blown
AIDS can be up to seven years, and it has been noted that longer
incubation periods may be possible. 5 However, once an6 individual develops AIDS, life expectancy shrinks to two years.

favored groups. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1269 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). The stigma which attaches to infection is not only great,
but invites intolerable social consequences. See id. at 1269 ("AIDS brings with it a
special stigma. Attitude surveys show that even though most Americans understand
the modes through which HIV is spread, a significant minority still would exclude
those who are HIV-positive from schools, public accommodations, and the workplace.") (quoting Gostin, supra note 6, at 46).
'0 See U.S. AIDS cases reported through January 1992, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE 1, 5 fig.1 (1992).
" See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 1994, 44
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 64, 67 (1995). By 1992, AIDS had already become the leading cause of death in men between the ages of 25 through 44 according
to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). See Update:Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome - United States, 1993, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 125, 125
(1993). However, a 1996 CDC report on births and deaths released on September 11,
1997, and reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer concluded that as a result of a 26%
drop overall in the rate of AIDS related deaths during 1995-96, AIDS is no longer
the number one, but is now the second leading cause of death of individuals ages 2544. AIDS Drops Back as Young Adults' Killer, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 12, 1997, at
A28.
12 See Lieberman & Derse, supra note 3, at 337.
13 See HIV/AIDS: Knowledge and Awareness of Testing and Treatment - BehavioralRisk FactorSurveillance System, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 300,
302 (1991). According to a CDC survey, a substantial number of respondents expressed belief that one can contract HIV through donating blood or insect bites. See
id.
14 See Gabel, supra note 2, at 986.
";See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 35
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 17, 20 (1986).
16See Fun, supra note 5, at 8.
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TRANSMISSION FROM PRACTITONER TO PATIENT

Extensive and in-depth studies into transmission from
practitioner to patients in the medical environment currently do
not exist."7 However, existing studies and estimates indicate a
very low risk.18 CDC estimates put the risk of a practitioner-topatient infection at 0.0024%.' 9 Despite this apparently remote
risk of infection, a practitioner-to-patient transmission has been
reported. 2' This case involved a Florida dentist, David Acer, who
infected five of his patients, including Kimberly
Bergalis, whose
21
tragic condition garnered extensive publicity.
According to reports, Ms. Bergalis was not in a high-risk
group for HIV. 22 That is, she neither used drugs intravenously,
nor had blood transfusions, nor actively engaged in sexual relations with multiple partners. She reported having had only two
boyfriends prior to her infection. The two men were screened
and both tested negative for HIV. Reports indicated that Dr.
Acer reported occasional needle sticks but stopped doing so after
testing positive for HIV. During the dental treatment, he allegedly wore gloves and a mask.'
A CDC investigation into Dr. Acer's conduct concluded that
he was the source of Ms. Bergalis's infection.24 The report from
the investigation, however, posited three caveats. First, it expressed uncertainty as to whether Dr. Acer's blood came into
contact with Ms. Bergalis's during the procedure.' The uncertainty allegedly resulted from lack of detailed information regarding disinfection and sterilization practices of Dr. Acer's den-

17See Gostin, supra note 6, at 21. But see Tomlinson, supra note 1, at 563

(stating that CDC estimates that as many as 128 people have been infected with
HIV by health care provider).
18 See Ben Mishu et al., A Surgeon with AIDS: Lack of Evidence of Transmission
to Patients, 264 JAMA 467 (1990) (finding no patients of HIV infected surgeon had
been infected with HMi).
19 See Update: Transmission of HIV during an Invasive Dental Procedure, 40
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 2 (1991).
'0 See Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient
during an Invasive Dental Procedure,39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 489,
489-90 (1990) [hereinafter DentalProcedure].
21 See

Gabel, supra note 2, at 1016-17 n.234. Ms. Bergalis died two years after

exposure to the infected dentist. See id.
22 See Dental Procedure, supranote 20, at 489-90.
2 See id.
24 See id.
25 See id.

at 491.
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tal office.2 6 Second, it cautioned that the possibility of a different
source of infection could not be ruled out, since Ms. Bergalis's
HIV status prior to the dental procedure was unknown.2 7 Finally, the report noted that the DNA method used in comparing
Dr. Acer's and Ms. Bergalis's genes was relatively new.28
Despite the foregoing caveats, the CDC investigation concluded, based on the viral sequencing found, that Dr. Acer most
probably infected Ms. Bergalis.29 Assuming arguendo that the
Acer-Bergalis infection was unusual, it still provides evidence of
practitioner-patient transmission. Additionally, "the CDC estimates that, as of 1990, between 13 and 128 medical and dental
patients may have been infected with HIV through surgical and
dental procedures.""
LEGAL OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE UNDER THE INFORMED CONSENT
DOCTRINE
The informed consent doctrine, generally regarded as part of
the negligence doctrine, but classified as a battery in Pennsylvania 3' and a few other states, requires a practitioner to inform
a patient of all material risks, benefits, and alternatives attendant upon a proposed treatment option.3 The informed consent
doctrine has two variations. In a majority of jurisdictions, governed by what is popularly known as the prudent physician
' See id.

See id.
See id.
2 See id.; see also David Brown, The 1990 FloridaDental Investigation: Theory
and Fact, 124 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 255 (1996) (stating that investigation by
CDC concludes that Dr. Acer infected the patients). However, some later studies
have cast doubt on whether Ms. Bergalis was infected by her dentist. See Stephen
Barr, The 1990 Florida Dental Investigation: Is the Case Really Closed?, 124
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 250 (1996) (submitting that patients were infected
through well-documented routes of HIV transmission and not by dentist). But see
Brown, supra (refuting Stephen Barr's article because it does not present evidence
that affirmatively supports an alternative explanation).
2' Michelle Wilcox DeBarge, The Performance of Invasive Procedures by HIVInfected Doctors: The Duty to Disclose Under the Informed Consent Doctrine, 25
CONN. L. REV. 991, 1007 (1993).
31 See Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (stating that
operation without informed consent is technical assault).
32See 61 AM1. JUR. Physicians& Surgeons §§ 187, 189, 191, 192 (1981 & Supp.
1997) (citing cases in Mississippi, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania which support battery theory).
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that
test for disclosure is materiality to patient's decision).
17
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standard, a practitioner has an obligation to disclose to a patient
only information which a reasonable practitioner would consider
disclosing under the same or similar circumstances. 4 A minority
of jurisdictions, however, follow what is known as the reasonable

patient standard, under which a practitioner is required to disclose all pieces of information which a reasonable patient would
consider material
in deciding whether to undergo a proposed
5
treatment.

Central to the issue of disclosure of HIV status under either
variation of the informed consent doctrine is the materiality of

the risk of transmission from practitioner to patient.
A. Materialityof the Risk of Transmission Under the
Reasonable PatientStandardand the Obligation to Disclose
In Canterbury v. Spence,36 a patient brought a suit against
his physician, alleging in part that the physician breached the
informed consent doctrine by failing to warn him of a onepercent risk of paralysis from a laminectomy.37 The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant physician upon a motion.38
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. '9
Addressing plaintiffs contention that a one-percent risk of
paralysis from a laminectomy was material, and therefore warranted disclosure, the appellate court held that "due care nor-

mally demands that the physician warn the patient of any risks
to his well-being which contemplated therapy may involve.""
Broadly interpreting materiality, the Canterbury court emphasized that " '[a] risk is thus material when a reasonable person,
in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's
position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to [undergo] the proposed
therapy."' 4 ' Additionally, Canterburystressed that "all risks pos See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INFORMED CONSENT §

22.08 (Matthew Bender 1991).
s" See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786 (holding that patient's right of self-decision
should determine boundaries of duty of disclosure).
"6464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
37

See id. at 778.

3"See id.
"' See id. at 779 (stating that patient's testimony made out prima facie case that
physician was in violation of his duty to disclose).
40 Id. at 781.
41 Id. at 787 (first alteration in original) (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W.

1997]

HIV-POSITIVE MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

tentially affecting [a patient's] decision must be unmasked."42
An argument opponents of disclosure frequently make is
that the risk of practitioner-to-patient transmission is so remote
that it should be considered immaterial.43 Although risk of practitioner-patient transmission is probably very small, the actual
rate of transmission is uncertain." A reasonable patient may
consider this uncertainty material when deciding to undergo or
forego a proposed treatment option. Even assuming arguendo
the adequacy of current studies pointing to the remote risks of
transmission, the patient should be permitted to decide whether
a remote risk in the AIDS context is material.
Even if the practitioner-to-patient transmission rate is less
than the one-percent risk held to be material in Canterbury, it
should be noted that a one-percent risk is not a benchmark of
materiality.45
In Hartke v. McKelway,46 a patient alleged that her physician breached the informed consent doctrine by failing to inform
her of a 0.1% to 0.3% risk of pregnancy following a laparoscopic
cauterization.47 In upholding the trial court's determination that
this remote risk of pregnancy was material, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the physician had
an obligation to disclose." Relevant to the Hartke court, was the
realization that pregnancy posed a great threat to the patient's
health.49 In addition, the court determined that the physician
was aware that had she been informed, she would have considScheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)); accord Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Mass. 1982).
42 Canterbury, 464

F.2d at 787.

" See Fun, supra note 5, at 41. Mr. Fun argues that disclosure is unnecessary
because of the remote risk of infection from practitioner-to-patient. See id.
" See Tomlinson, supra note 1, at 563 (noting that "[e]xtensive studies do not
exist concerning the risk of HIV transmission from a health care provider to a patient"); see also Gostin, supra note 6, at 21 (stating that "no systematic attempt has
been made to discover which physicians are HIV-positive and whether their patients
contract HIV").
'sSee Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding 0.1 to
0.3% risk material).
"3707 F.2d 1544.
47See id. at 1547 (stating that Dr. McKelway failed to disclose risk of one to
three out of one thousand that sterilization procedure Ms. Hartke was to undergo
would not be effective).
48 See id. at 1549.
4 See id. at 1548-49 (stating that plaintiff had a history, known to her doctor, of
high-risk pregnancies and post-delivery complications).
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ered this remote risk material."
The Hartke rationale is relevant to the issue of disclosure in
the AIDS context. AIDS invariably results in death.5 It presently has no cure.52 It is foreseeable to an infected practitioner
that a reasonable patient undergoing invasive procedures would
attach significance to the possibility of transmission, no matter
how small the risk.53 This is especially likely in light of facts indicating that invasive procedures frequently result in needle
sticks and scalpel cuts. "Studies indicate that surgeons will cut
or puncture a glove in approximately one out of every four [25%]
cases and will sustain a significant skin cut in one out of every
forty [2.5%] cases. 54
Arguments against disclosure, predicated on the alleged
immateriality of the risk of transmission from practitioner to
patient, fail to appreciate that under Canterbury, it is the patient, not the practitioner, who ultimately decides whether a risk
is material or not before undergoing or foregoing a treatment
option.55 Under the reasonable patient standard espoused in
Canterbury, it does not matter whether a patient's fear of a risk
of harm appears unwise from a practitioner's perspective.56 This
is because "[t]he keystone of this doctrine is every competent
'0 See id. at 1549 (stating that had plaintiff known of risks, she may have reasonably changed her mind to consider a hysterectomy or to have her boyfriend, later
her husband, undergo a vasectomy).
"' See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
,2 See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
' See Gostin, supra note 6, at 23. Professor Gostin argues that "[i]nformation
that their physician is seropositive, at least in the subjective view of most patients,
is highly relevant to the treatment decisions patients must make." Id. He also
stressed that "[a] patient usually has a choice of physicians, and many would not
choose a physician who is infected with HIV." Id. His argument was bolstered by a
University of California - San Francisco study entitled, Public Perceptionof Healthcare Workers and HIV Mixed, AIDS WKLY., Feb. 15, 1993, which found that 37% of
1,350 adults questioned would change physicians if they knew the physician was
HIV positive. The study also found that 93% of the survey respondents thought that
infected professionals should be required to disclose their status to their patients.
Id.
, Gostin, supra note 6, at 20; see also Troyen Brennan, Transmission of the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus in the Healthcare Setting. Time for Action, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1504, 1504 (1991) (noting that "[recent studies have shown that
needle-stick injuries are common").
""See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781 (stating that it is patient's choice to determine direction his treatment will take).
"' See id. at 787 (stating that "the issue on nondisclosure must be approached
from the viewpoint of the reasonableness of the physician's divulgence in terms of
what he knows or should know to be the patient's informational needs").
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adult's right to forego treatment, or even cure, if it entails what
for him are intolerable consequences or risks however unwise his
of the medical profession, or
sense of values may be
5 7 in the eyes
community."
the
even
A patient has the right to determine where his or her interests lie.58 Therefore, even a very small risk of death, which eventually results from infection with HIV,may be material to a patient, requiring disclosure.59 It is also worth noting that as the
severity of a risk outcome increases, the importance attached to
the probability of an infection actually materializing decreases,
and the duty to disclose assumes heightened importance. °
B. Materialityof Risk of Transmission Under the Prudent
PhysicianStandardand the Duty to Disclose
Analysis under the prudent physician standard of informed
consent also supports disclosure. Commentators and studies
indicate that practitioners are very reluctant to treat infected
patients.6 In particular, a study published in the American
Journal of Medicine found that half of primary-care physicians
surveyed would not treat HIV-infected patients, if given a
choice," even though the risk of transmission from patient to
practitioner is equally low,' or even less than the risk of infection from practitioner-to-patient.64
'7 Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (R.I. 1972). This statement in Wilkinson is especially poignant since some arguments against disclosure focus on patients' alleged absence of rational calculation of risks in the AIDS context. While
some of these arguments have merit, a patient still may refuse treatment by an infected doctor if he or she deems the risk of transmission significant.
See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786 (holding that patient's right of self-decision
controls).
r9See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that
0.1 to 0.3% risk of pregnancy after sterilization procedure was material).
c' See Wilkinson, 295 A.2d at 688 ("What is a reasonable disclosure in one instance may not be reasonable in another.").
61See Brennan, supra note 54, at 1504-05. Dr. Brennan noted that "[a]lthough
most physicians recognize a duty to treat patients with HIV infection, this does not
translate into a universal willingness to do so." Id.; see also Gostin, supra note 6, at
12-13. Professor Gostin points out that despite the remote possibility of practitionerpatient transmission, healthcare workers, especially those engaged in invasive procedures, claim a right to know whether their patients are HIV-infected, and to
screen them for HIV even without their consent. See id.
6"See Amir Halevy & Baruch Brody, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and
The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Legal Duty to Treat, 96 AM. J. MED. 282,
282-83 (1994).
See Gostin, supra note 6, at 21.
See Brennan, supra note 54, at 1505. Dr. Brennan opined that "[a] single in-
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Judging from the foregoing survey, it appears reasonable to
conclude that a majority of practitioners consider the risk of
transmission material in deciding whether to render treatment.
As such, a practitioner has an obligation to disclose his or her
HIV status even under the prudent physician standard.
Any attempts to reserve to the practitioner a right to consider risk of patient-to-practitioner transmission material while
denying the same to a patient will undermine the backbone of
the informed consent doctrine, which rests on the concept that
"[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his [or her] own body." 5
The appellate courts that have examined the risk of HIV
transmission from practitioner-to-patient have split, either
finding the risk material and thus, warranting disclosure," or
finding a patient's fear of risk of exposure unreasonable as a
matter of law.67
SELECTED CASES ON DISCLOSURE

A.

Estate of Behringer v. The Medical Center at Princeton'
In early June 1987, the plaintiff, a board certified surgeon,
with attending and surgical privileges at the defendant Medical
Center ("Center"), felt ill. Following a distress call to the Center,
the plaintiff was admitted to the emergency room. Upon examining the plaintiff, the treating physician determined that performance of a bronchoscopy was necessary.69 Results of the bronchoscopy revealed that the plaintiff had AIDS.
fected health care provider who undertakes invasive procedures can infect many
more patients than a seropositive patient can infect providers." Id.
65Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo,
J.), overruledon other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
66 See Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that HIV-infected surgeon does pose significant risk even though the
possibility of transmission of disease was remote).
67 See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 180 (1993); see also
Brzoska v.
Dolson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1367 (Del. 1995) (finding no affirmative duty to disclose, but
finding misrepresentation where dentist lied to direct patient inquiries about his
HIV status). The Kerins and Brzoska courts were concerned with the flood of litigation that would result from determining that such a remote risk was material.
68592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
6" See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1255. A bronchoscopy is a medical diagnostic procedure involving bronchial washings to establish the presence or absence of Pneumocystic Carinii Pneumonia (PCP). A positive indication of PCP conclusively establishes the presence of AIDS. See id.
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News of the plaintiffs diagnosis spread quickly within the
Center, and eventually reached its president, Dennis Doody. Mr.
Doody immediately canceled the plaintiffs pending surgical
cases. 71 Subsequent to Mr. Doody's action, the Board of Trustees,
following a special meeting, voted to require HIV positive surgeons to disclose their status to patients prior to surgery.71 After
several months of intense consultations between the medical and
dental staff, hospital administration, and the Board of Trustees,
the Center adopted a measure prohibiting any HIV positive
practitioner from performing any "procedures that pose any risk
of [HIV] transmission to the patient."72 Based on the foregoing
policy, the Center suspended the plaintiffs surgical privileges.
The plaintiff filed suit alleging, in part, that the Center's
policy violated New Jersey's statutory prohibition against discrimination7 3 by requiring HIV positive surgeons to disclose their
status to patients prior to surgery.74
Addressing the plaintiffs specific allegations that "1) the
risk of transmission of HIV from surgeon to patient is too remote
to require informed consent, and 2) the law of informed consent
does not require disclosure of the condition of the surgeon,"75 the
court noted:
70 See id. at 1257. Since Mr. Doody's decision to suspend plaintiffs surgical
privileges was based on insufficient research, the chairman of the department of
surgery privately investigated the matter and urged that plaintiff be allowed to
continue his surgical practice. In order to suspend a physician's surgical privileges,
the policy of the Center requires a vote by the department chair, president of the
Center, president of the medical and dental staff, chairman of the board of trustees,
and the physician in charge of the service. Although Dr. Doody's vote for suspension
was defeated, plaintiffs surgical privileges remained suspended. The matter was
ultimately brought to the attention of the board of trustees. See id.
71 See id. at 1258.
72 Id. at 1260. The Center adopted, in relevant part, the following policy: "2. A
physician or health care provider with known EIV seropositivity may continue to
treat patients at The Medical Center at Princeton, but shall not perform procedures
that pose any risk of HIV transmission to the patient." Id. at 1260 (emphasis omitted).
"The Law Against Discrimination Act "prohibit[s] any unlawful discrimination
against any person because such person is or has been at any time handicapped or
any unlawful employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of the handicap reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West 1993). The New Jersey Superior Court
in Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900, 903 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1987), determined that a
person suffering from AIDS has a handicap within the meaning of the Law Against
Discrimination Act.
7 See Behringer,592 A.2d at 1274.
75Id. at 1279.
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It is [this] court's view that the risk of transmission is not the
sole risk involved. The risk of a surgical accident, i.e., a needlestick or scalpel cut, during surgery performed by an HIVpositive surgeon, may subject a previously uninfected patient to
months or even years of continual HIV testing. Both of these
risks are sufficient to meet the Jansen standard of "probability
7s
77
of harm"78 and the Largey standard requiring disclosure.
The court emphasized that an "infected surgeon, even if the
virus drastically shortens his surgical career, can be expected to
perform numerous operations. Assuming that the surgical patient's risk is exceedingly low (1/130,000), the risk that one of his
patients will contract HIV becomes more realistic the more operations he performs."79 Ultimately, the court, in its assessment
of the materiality of risk, concluded that "the risk of accident and
implications thereofwould be a legitimate concern to the surgical
patient, warranting disclosure of this risk in the informed-consent setting.""°
Responding to plaintiff's argument that a better approach to
disclosure would be a case-by-case analysis, by the hospital and
its medical staff, of a practitioner's ability to continue with invasive procedures, s1 the court stressed:
While this approach may be an appropriate starting point, it can
not be dispositive of the issue. Plaintiffs position fails to account for "any risk" and, more important, fails to consider the
76

In Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 541 A.2d 682, 688 (N.J. 1988), the

New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employer may, consistent with the statutory prohibition against discrimination, remove an employee from a certain position
if the employee poses a reasonable probability of substantial harm to others. In order to determine if the employee poses a threat, "an employer may consider whether
the handicapped person can do his or her work without posing a serious threat of
injury to the health and safety of ... other employees." Id. at 687-88 (citing Panettieri v. C.V. Hill Refrigeration, 388 A.2d 630 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)).
77 In Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988), the New Jersey Supreme
Court adopted the reasonable patient standard and overruled Kaplan v. Haines, 241
A.2d 235 (N.J. 1968), which made the prudent physician standard applicable in New
Jersey. The Largey court emphasized that a practitioner must disclose all information to a patient which may affect the patient's decision whether or not to undergo a
proposed treatment option. Largey, 540 A.2d at 509 ("The foundation for the physician's duty to disclose ... is found in the idea that 'it is the prerogative of the patient,
not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem
to lie.' ") (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
78 See Behringer, 592 A.2d
at 1279.
79 Id. at 1280. The risk would be 1/1,300 assuming one hundred operations,
and
would increase to 1/126 assuming five hundred operations. See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
"' See id. at 1281.
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patient's input into the decision-making process. The position
plaintiff seeks to implement is replete with the "anachronistic
paternalism" rejected in both Canterbury v. Spence ... and by
the Supreme Court in Largey v. Rothman. 2
In its evaluation, the court also quoted Professor Gostin's
statement that "[a] reasonably prudent patient would find information that his physician is infected with HIV material to his
decision to consent to a seriously invasive procedure because the
potential harm is severe and the risk, while low, is not negligible."' The court also made it clear that while infected practitioners may be adversely affected by a disclosure requirement, noninfected practitioners will step in to provide needed care to patients."
B.

Faya v. Almaraz

Two years after Behringer,two companion appeals involving
disclosure came before the Maryland Court of Appeals. Facts
recited by the court of appeals show that two years after testing
HIV positive, defendant Rudolf Almaraz, M.D., an oncological
surgeon with operating privileges at Johns Hopkins Hospital in
Baltimore, performed invasive surgeries on plaintiffs Sonja Faya
and Perry Mahoney Rossi at the Hospital. 6
Three weeks after Dr. Almaraz's death from AIDS-related
complications, the plaintiffs learned of his HIV and AIDS infections from a local newspaper. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed
suit against Dr. Almaraz's estate, his professional business entity, and the hospital for compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that Dr. Almaraz breached the informed consent doctrine by failing to inform them prior to surgery of his HIV and AIDS infections. 7
Following a defense motion, the trial court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted." The trial court indicated that the plaintiffs failed to
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1283 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1282.
620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
See id. at 329. On October 27, 1989, Dr. Almaraz was diagnosed with cytomegalovirus retinitis, an eye infection signaling full-blown AIDS. Nevertheless, he
operated on plaintiff Rossi approximately three weeks later on November 14, 1989.
See id.
87 See id. at 329-30.
" See id. at 330.
2
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sufficiently allege actual exposure to the AIDS virus, and they
tested negative for the virus. 89 Plaintiffs appealed to the court of
special appeals. However, before the intermediate appellate
court could review the appeal, the court of appeals granted certiorari. 9°
Addressing the issue of whether Dr. Almaraz should have
informed the plaintiffs of his HIV status prior to surgery, or
should have refrained from performing the surgeries, the court
held "we cannot say as a matter of law that no duty was imposed
upon Dr. Almaraz to warn the appellants of his infected condition or refrain from operating upon them."9 1 On the issue of vicarious liability against the hospital, the court held:
Because it is undisputed that Almaraz enjoyed "operative
privileges" at Hopkins, we cannot say as a matter of law that
the facts alleged in the appellants' complaints are legally insufficient on their face to aver an agency relationship. Thus, the
trial court erred in dismissing appellants' basic negligence
complaints against Hopkins.92
In support of its decision, the court noted that AIDS is an infectious disease and stressed that an important premise underlying the duty to inform is the foreseeability of harm. The court
then emphasized that "[ulnder the allegations of the appellants'
complaints, taken as true, it was foreseeable that Dr. Almaraz
might transmit the AIDS virus to his patients during invasive
surgery."9 3 In support of the decision, the court quoted AMA
guidelines cautioning HIV-positive practitioners against performing9 invasive
procedures when a risk of HIV transmission is
4
present.
To counter defense arguments on the remote risk of transmission from practitioner to patient, the court reiterated that
"legal scholars have long agreed that the seriousness of potential
harm, as well as its probability, contributes to a duty to prevent
it."95 The court poignantly noted that "[w]hile it may be unlikely
that an infected doctor will transmit the AIDS virus to a patient
during surgery, the patient will almost surely die if the virus is
9See id. at 330-31.
"See id. at 331.
"1Id. at 334.
92 Id. at 339.
9' Id. at 333.
9'See id. at 334.
9' Id. at 333 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293(c) cmt. c (1965)).
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transmitted.""
C. In re Hershey Medical Center9 7
In the same year Faya was decided, the question of disclosure came up for review before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
However, the issue involved disclosure after surgery. The facts
of the case indicated that following a scalpel cut during surgery,
appellant, John Doe,- M.D., a resident surgeon at both Hershey
Medical Center and the Harrisburg Hospital, voluntarily underwent an HIV blood test. 8 The test result came back positive for
the HIV virus. Subsequently, Dr. Doe withdrew from participation in further surgical procedures, informed the hospitals, and
took a leave of absence.
Following Dr. Doe's revelation of his positive HIV status, "in
recognition of the fact that, in a small but nevertheless significant percentage of surgical procedures, surgeons suffer cuts that
result in possible transfers of blood to patients," 9 the hospitals
conducted investigations to ascertain the number of patients who
may have been at risk of contact with Dr. Doe's blood. At the
conclusion of the investigations the hospitals filed petitions
"alleging that there was, under the Confidentiality of HIVRelated Information Act (HIV Act),"' a 'compelling need' to disclose information regarding Dr. Doe's condition to the patients
potentially affected thereby as well as to certain physicians on
the medical staffs."'1 The hospitals asserted that "disclosure ...
was necessary to prevent the spread of HIV and to provide
treatment, testing, and counseling.""°2 In opposition Dr. Doe

"

Id.
634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993).
See id. at 160.
IId.

100
101

35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7601-7612 (1993) (footnote added).
Hershey, 634 A.2d at 160. The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information

Act provides in relevant part:
(a) Order to disclose.-No court may issue an order to allow access to confidential HIV-related information unless the court finds, upon application,
that one of the following conditions exists:
(1) The person seeking the information has demonstrated a compelling
need for that information which cannot be accommodated by other
means.
(2) The person seeking to disclose the information has a compelling
need to do so.
35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7608(a) (1993).
102Hershey, 634 A.2d at 160.
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countered that a "compelling need" was lacking, "and that he
10 3
was entitled to confidentiality under the [HIV Act."
After a hearing, the trial court granted the petitions, but
limited disclosure of Dr. Doe's identity to physicians in the obstetrics and gynecology departments (the relevant departments),
and to other physicians "authorized in writing by a patient for
whom Dr. Doe participated in a surgical procedure or obstetrical
care."0 4 Dr. Doe appealed alleging that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding that the hospitals demonstrated a
"compelling need" under the HIV Act. The superior court affirmed.105
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted the appeal.
Noting that the HIV Act failed to define the term "compelling
need," the court emphasized that HIV was infectious and that infection with AIDS invariably results in death. 0 6 Stressing that
the legislative purpose behind the Act was curtailing the spread
of HIV and AIDS,0 7 the court held that "[t]he possibility that
disclosure would help to limit the spread of HIV, and thereby
save lives, provided the trial court with an ample basis for concluding that a compelling need for disclosure had been established.'0 8
The court noted that the trial court's order was narrowly
drawn to protect Dr. Doe's privacy concerns while accommodating the hospital's need for disclosure. The court also stressed
that the maxim, salus populi suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law), should be applied given the nature of
the case. 9
The Hershey case is instructive on the obligation to disclose.
Even though it involved disclosure after a surgical accident, it is
apparent that the court would have construed a failure to disclose a positive HIV status prior to surgery to be violative of the
103

id.

'0' Id. The order also authorized the hospitals to describe Dr. Doe "in letters to
patients and in media releases as 'a physician in our joint Obstetrics and Gynecology residency program' and by setting forth the relevant period of such service." Id.
100 See id. at 159.
106 See id. at 161-62.

The HIV Act states in part: "(c) Intent.-It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote confidential testing on an informed and voluntary basis in order
to encourage those most in need to obtain testing and appropriate counseling." 35
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7602(c).
108 Hershey, 634 A.2d at 162.
'07

109

See id. at 163.
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informed consent doctrine.
D. Kerins v. Hartley...

Approximately one week after performing invasive surgical
procedures on plaintiff Jean R. Kerins, defendant James S. Gordon, M.D., tested positive for HIV. Subsequently, Dr. Gordon informed his partners at the Women's Medical Group of Santa
Monica (WSG) of his test results, but he continued engaging in
invasive procedures."' Two years later, Dr. Gordon developed
full-blown AIDS, and his partners prevented him from performing any invasive procedures. He announced his illness on television after filing a discrimination suit against the individuals
"who had refused to permit him to return to his surgical prac2
11

tice,,

Upon observing Dr. Gordon's television announcement, the
plaintiff underwent a test for HIV. The result came back negative.'
Notwithstanding the negative result, the plaintiff filed
suit against Dr. Gordon and WSG, seeking monetary damages
for emotional distress allegedly resulting in part from Dr. Gordon's commission of a battery."4 To support the battery allegation, the plaintiff alleged that her consent to surgery was conditioned on Dr. Gordon's good health. The plaintiff argued that
Dr. Gordon's failure to disclose his positive HIV-status at the
time of surgery constituted technical battery because it vitiated
her original consent." 5
The trial court dismissed the action on a defense motion for
summary judgment."6 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the issue called for a jury determination.1 7 On reconsideration, however,
the appellate court affirmed the trial
18
court's decision."

The court's decision to sustain the summary judgment ruling
implies that disclosure of positive HIV-status was not required
at the time of the surgery in light of a 1986 CDC guideline em"0 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (1993).

. See id. at 174-75.
12

See id. at 175.
id.

113See

. See id. at 174.
"
"

See id. at 180-81.
See id. at 174.

117See id.
118 See

id.
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phasizing universal barrier precautions as the best means of
preventing HIV transmission from practitioner to patient."' In
support of its ruling, the court opined that the plaintiffs "fear of
developing AIDS is not based on knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion." 120 However, the court noted
that the imposition of a legal obligation on infected practitioners
to disclose their status to patients exceeded the scope of the issues presented. 2 '
To the extent that Kerins implied nondisclosure based on
CDC guidelines, such implication is misplaced. Although CDC
guidelines are unquestionably significant on the issue of AIDS,
the guidelines are not even regulatory; therefore, they are not
dispositive22 on the legal obligations of a practitioner to his or her
patients.
THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE
Existing ethical guidelines for practitioners also support the
argument for disclosure. Both AMA and ADA guidelines recommend that infected doctors either refrain from performing invasive procedures, or inform their patients of their HIV status
prior to surgery." AMA guidelines state that if a risk of transmission exists a practitioner has an ethical obligation to inform
the patient and to refrain from engaging in any activity which
carries "an identifiable risk of transmission." 124 Furthermore,
the AMA recommends that a seropositive physician consult colleagues to decide what activities he or she can safely pursue
177.
Id. at 181.
121 See id.

119See id. at
120

122 See

Gostin, supra note 6, at 26 (noting that CDC guidelines may be used in

negligence cases to set professional standard of care, but they are not regulatory in
nature).
122 See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the
Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 JAMA 1360-61 (1988) [hereinafter Ethical Issues]
(discussing ethical dilemmas faced in light of AIDS epidemic); see also Lawrence K.
Altman, AIDS-Infected Doctors and Dentists Are Urged to Warn Patients or Quit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at A18 (discussing recommendations made by AMA and
ADA). The ADA stated, "that until uncertainties about the transmission of the virus
were resolved, dentists carrying the AIDS virus 'should refrain from performing invasive procedures or should disclose their seropositive status.' "Id.
124 Altman, supra note 123, at A18. The council stated that "[a] physician
who
knows that he or she has an infectious disease should not engage in any activity
that creates a risk of transmission of the disease to others." Ethical Issues, supra
note 123, at 1361.
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without posing a risk to patients.'2
Meanwhile, in 1987, the CDC recommended a case-by-case
inquiry by an infected practitioner's personal physician, the employing hospital, and the local medical board to determine
whether the practitioner should continue invasive procedures. 2 6
Despite the 1987 recommendation, a 1991 CDC recommendation
suggested that an infected practitioner127should inform patients
prior to performing invasive procedures.
It is clear that medical ethical guidelines favor disclosure.
Although ethics recommendations do not have the force of law, 28
they provide a basis for assessing
the standard of care imposed
2 9
in their respective professions.
Although AMA, ADA, and CDC guidelines appear to support
disclosure of HIV status prior to invasive procedures, opponents
of disclosure may question their validity and substance. Therefore, a brief analysis of the guidelines is warranted. It could be
argued that professional conduct is ethically valid if it is required and/or encouraged within the relevant profession, as well
as, legally sanctioned.'
The Hippocratic Oath, sworn to and emphasized by the
medical profession, requires a practitioner only to undertake

125See id.

126See Recommendations for Prevention of HIV

Transmissionin HealthcareSettings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. 2S, 16S (Supp. 1987).
1 7 See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of H1V and
Hepatitis B
Virus to Patients during Exposure Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-8, 5 (1991) (stating that healthcare workers "who
are infected with HIV ... should not perform exposure-prone procedures unless they
have ... been advised under what circumstances, if any, they may continue to perform these procedures. Such circumstances would include notifying prospective patients of the [healthcare worker's] seropositivity before they undergo exposureprone invasive procedures").
12s See Lieberman & Derse, supra note 3, at 341 (discussing the differences in
opinion among the nation's health care organizations on issue of disclosure).
12 See Tomlinson, supra note 1, at 575. Ms. Tomlinson argues that AMA guidelines provide some evidence that the medical profession acknowledges the duty to
inform in HIV situations. See id. at 573; see also Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327, 334
(Md. 1993) (citing with approval AMA Code of Ethics which provides "'[a] physician
who knows that he or she is [HIVI seropositive should not engage in any activity
that creates a risk of transmission of the disease to others'") (alteration in original); EthicalIssues, supra note 123, at 1361.
120See AREAS & HUNT, Ethical Theory in the Medical Context, reprinted in
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS 7 (West 1991)

(noting that whether action is wrong or right depends on whether society approves
of that action).
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measures which benefit the patient.131 AMA principles of Medical Ethics,'32 which define essentials of honorable behavior for
medical practitioners, implore practitioners to respect the law
and patients' rights, and to deal honestly with patients.'3 3 Additionally, the medical profession consistently opines that practitioners should err on the side of protecting patients when risks
are unclear.'
Disclosure is consistent with the Hippocratic Oath's admonition to practitioners only to undertake measures beneficial to
the patient. Because the risk of transmission from practitioner
to patient is uncertain, a practitioner's disclosure of his or her infection benefits the patient. Such a disclosure allows the patient
to decide where his interests lie.
Disclosure also accords with a practitioner's ethical obligation to deal with the patients honestly and to respect their
rights, since it appears that most patients prefer to be informed
of their physician's HIV status.' 5
Furthermore, disclosure of HIV infection assures compliance
with the informed consent doctrine, which requires disclosure of
all material information affecting a treatment option. Finally,
the ethical guidelines advance the medical profession's admonition to practitioners to place the interest of patients above theirs
in the event of a conflict. Patients have an interest in knowing
whether a practitioner is infected before any invasive procedures. Infected practitioners, on the other hand, have an interest in keeping their infection confidential. The competing interests pose a conflict.
EXCEPTIONS TO DISCLOSURE

Notwithstanding its requirements, the informed consent
doctrine provides two exceptions to disclosure. 6 Each of the ex-

"3'

30.

See Oath of Hippocrates, reprinted in FURROW ET AL., supra note 130, at 29-

132 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Principlesof Medical
Ethics, reprinted
in FURROW ET AL., supra note 130, at 31.
" See id. at 32.
See generally id.
"' See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing importance that patients place on right to be told of their physician's HIV status); see also Fun, supra
note 5, at 42 (stating that 80% of people surveyed said that HIV infected physicians
should inform patients of their status).
136 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

19971

HIV-POSITIVE MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

First, under the
ceptions involves a privilege not to disclose.'
therapeutic privilege, a practitioner may withhold information of
a material risk from a patient if disclosure would so adversely
affect the patient's mental state so as to foreclose the ability to
make a rational decision concerning a proposed treatment.3 8
Secondly, a practitioner is privileged from the disclosure requirement in an emergency situation where the patient is
"unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting[, no close
relative is available to consent], and harm from a failure to treat
is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by the proposed treatment." 39
May an infected practitioner, consistent with these two exceptions, withhold his or her illness from patients prior to invasive procedures? An infected practitioner's failure to disclose
will not likely be influenced by a desire to protect a patient from
an irrational fear of AIDS. On the contrary, a practitioner's motivation for nondisclosure involves, at least in part, a desire to
protect his or her practice and privacy. 40 Assuming arguendo
that a practitioner's primary motive for nondisclosure is to protect a patient from an irrational fear of AIDS, the exception to
the informed consent doctrine still is not sufficient to permit
nondisclosure. The exception is premised upon a physician's determination that disclosure would threaten a patient's wellbeing.'
Arguing that the informed consent doctrine does not
permit nondisclosure "simply because divulgence might prompt
the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient
really needs" is not sound.4 2 Upon disclosure of infection, a patient is not likely to endanger his or her welfare by foregoing
necessary treatment. Rather, if disclosure would affect the patient's decision to accept treatment, the patient would probably
proceed to a non-infected practitioner.
In emergency situations, however, where a patient requires
invasive treatment and is unconscious and incapable of consenting, and no relative is available to evaluate the risk of transmission from an infected practitioner, the question of disclosure be137 See
"s See

id.

id. at 789.
1" Id. at 788.

supra note 5, at 10 (explaining that exceptions to informed consent doctrine are designed to protect patient not practitioner).
"' See Canterbury,464 F.2d at 789.
140But see Fun,

142Id.
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comes murky. If the patient would die unless immediate action
was taken, it would be reasonable for the infected practitioner to
proceed with an invasive procedure, provided precautionary
measures were taken to avoid his blood from coming into contact
with the patient's, and provided further, that a non-infected
practitioner is unavailable to attend to the patient.
RECOGNITION OF A THIRD EXCEPTION FOR NON-DISCLOSURE?:
POLICY ARGUMENTS
In light of the foregoing conclusion that the two legal exceptions do not shield infected practitioners from disclosure, and of
strong adverse reactions to infected individuals by segments of
the population, a question arises as to whether another exception
for infected practitioners should be carved out on public policy
grounds. Some commentators have argued for such an excep4
tion.1 3
Strong arguments exist for this nondisclosure exception.
First, infected practitioners have a right to protect their identity
from public disclosure, consistent with privacy rights. The law
has recognized positive HIV-status as within the zone of privacy. 44 Second, a great stigma attaches to HIV status. 145 Third,
disclosure of a practitioner's infection will almost certainly ruin
his or her practice.141 Last, loss of the services of infected practitioners in fields with substantial numbers of HIV infected patients would be costly.
Notwithstanding strong arguments for a third exception,
stronger countervailing arguments exist. First, although the
risk of practitioner-patient transmission is probably low, the risk
of transmission is not the sole risk involved. The risk of a surgical accident may subject a patient to emotional distress and
months of continual testing. Experience demonstrates that once
contracted, infection with the AIDS virus invariably results in
death. Second, an infected practitioner has the options of
"3 See Fun, supra note 5, at 43 (arguing that third exception is supported on

public policy grounds because of stigma of AIDS, loss of skilled services, right to privacy, and loss of education and training).
1" See Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that
United States' Constitution protected plaintiffs from having to disclose to government their relative's AIDS status).
'45 See id. at 384.
146 See Fun, supra note 5, at 42 (explaining that stigma of AIDS results in physician's fear of loss of professional livelihood).
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changing specialty to non-invasive procedures, or practicing with
a smaller patient base in the event some patients decide to withdraw their patronage. These options are understandably difficult, but no one has a guaranteed right to practice a chosen profession without limitations.1 47 An infected patient, on the other
hand, has no viable options. Such a patient has to live with the
stigma of infection, and the knowledge that death will painfully
draw near sooner or later. Third, although loss of infected practitioners in some medical fields may adversely affect many patients, the overall impact on medical services would be minimal.
From 1981 to 1991, the health care industry employed only 5,815
infected individuals.'48 Furthermore, if disclosure results in a
mass desertion of infected practitioners, non-infected practitioners will take their places.
CONCLUSION

The informed consent doctrine and medical ethical guidelines both require HIV-positive practitioners to inform their patients of their status prior to invasive procedures. Although
strong public policy arguments exist for a non-disclosure exception, the finality of infection, uncertainty about the rate of
transmission, and the right of patients to determine where their
interests lie, all militate against an exception for non-disclosure.

DeBarge, supra note 30, at 1021.
148See Tomlinson, supra note 1, at 563. According to Ms. Tomlinson, dental and
surgical workers constituted an estimated 1,584. See id.
147 See
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